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I.R.C. Section 2518 and the Law of Disclaimers
The Tax Reform Act of 19761 introduced code section 2518,2 which
created definitive standards for a disclaimer to be valid for Federal Tax
purposes. As a result of its recent passage, lack of interpretive regula-
tions and absence of court interpretation,' its application in many areas
is unclear; consequently, much uncertainty surrounds the law of dis-
claimers. In an attempt to show the virtues, uncertainties and short-
comings of section 2518, this article will analyze section 2518 on two
different planes: (1) whether it carries out the intent of Congress and
(2) whether it can be improved to enhance the use of disclaimers as an
estate planning tool (a somewhat idealistic notion).
To discuss section 2518 meaningfully the reader must understand
the use of disclaimers as an estate planning tool, the common law of
disclaimers and the events which led to the enactment of section 2518.
Therefore, the article begins with several sections designed to acquaint
the reader with these areas. The remainder of the article is devoted to a
discussion of section 2518's effectiveness and suggestions to enhance its
effectiveness.
1. DISCLAIMERS AS AN ESTATE PLANNING TOOL
A disclaimer is the refusal to accept the ownership of property or
rights with respect to property.' The major importance of disclaimers is
the flexibility they provide for estate planning. Disclaimers can be used
to correct errors in an estate plan after it would ordinarily be too late
I. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 STAT. 1893, added I.R.C.
Sec. 2518.
2. I.R.C. See. 2518 (hereinafter referred to as 2518).
3. But see Ingham v. Hubbell, 462 F. Supp. 59 (S.D. Iowa 1978). In Hubbell,
the court was asked to decide a class action under the declaratory judgement act. The
issue was whether the plaintiffs disclaimer of a portion of a contingent interest was a
qualified disclaimer. The case was dismissed for lack of an actual controversy.
4. WAYS AND MEANS COMMITrEE REPORT accompanying HR 14844 H.R. REP.
No. 94-1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1976) (hereinafter cited as WAYS AND MEANS
CoMMITTEE REPORT).
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(for example after the testator's death), adjust the estate plan to ac-
count for changed circumstances, avoid the creditors of a beneficiary
and allow post mortem estate planning. The following examples will
demonstrate the use of disclaimers as a method of achieving tax sav-
ings; assume each of the following disclaimers are qualified.
A disclaimer may be used to save gift tax.5 A devises Whiteacre to
B. B has no need for Whiteacre and would prefer it to pass to his son
C. If B accepts Whiteacre and transfers it to C for less than adequate
and full consideration in money or money's worth, B has made a taxa-
ble gift to C.6 Whereas, if B disclaims Whiteacre which thereby passes
to C, no gift tax will be imposed on B.7 There is no gift from B to C
because B will be treated as never having owned Whiteacre.
A disclaimer may be used to save estate tax A devises Whiteacre
to B who is terminally ill. B would prefer to give Whiteacre to his son
C in a manner that will not have any tax ramifications. If B accepts
Whiteacre and then dies, Whiteacre will be included in B's gross es-
tate."0 If B disclaims Whiteacre, which thereby passes to C, there will
be no inclusion in B's gross estate, because B will again be treated as
never having owned Whiteacre. 1
A disclaimer may be used to prevent an overfunding or an un-
derfunding of a marital bequest for purposes of achieving the maxi-
5. I.R.C. Sec. 2518 (a); WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE REPORT AT 65.
6. I.R.C. Secs. 2501 and 2511; Treas. Reg. Sec. 25.2511-1(c), T.D. 6334, 1958-2
C.B. 643. See Hardenbergh v. Comm'r, 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir.), aff'd. 17 T.C. 166 cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 836 (1952); Bishop v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. Miss.
1970), afi'd per curiam, 26 AFTR 2d 1653 (5th Cir. 1972); Krakoff v. United States,
313 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Ohio 1970), aff'd. 439 F. 2d 1023 (6th Cir. 1971); William L.
Maxwell v. Comm'r, 17 T.C. 1589 (1952).
7. I.R.C. Sec. 2518(a); WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE REPORT at 65.
8. "(a) General Rule - For purposes of this subtitle, if a person makes a qualified
disclaimer with respect to any interest in property, this subtitle shall apply with respect
to such interest as if the interest had never been tranferred by such person." I.R.C.
Sec. 2518(a); WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE REPORT at 65.
9. I.R.C. Sec. 2518(a); WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE REPORT at 65. For pur-
poses of estate-tax, I.R.C. Sec. 2045 says 2518 applies.
10. "The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property to the
extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death." I.R.C. Sec.
2033; Treas. Reg. Sec. 20.2033-I.
11. Brown v. Rautzahn, 63 F. 2d 914 (6th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 641
(1933); I.R.C. Sec. 2518(a); WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE REPORT at 65.
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mum marital deduction." If an amount greater than the maximum
marital deduction allowable"3 passes to the surviving spouse, the excess
will be taxed in the estate of each spouse. 4 If the surviving spouse dis-
claims the excess'5 over the maximum marital deduction allowable, the
disclaimed property will not be included in the surviving spouse's gross
estate. 6 If an amount less than the maximum marital deduction allow-
able is provided for the surviving spouse, a disclaimer by another can
increase the property passing to the spouse and allow use of the full
marital deduction. 7 In much the same way, a disclaimer by one heir
can be used to increase an estate's charitable deduction.'" Thus, a dis-
claimer can be an important post mortem estate planning tool.
A disclaimer will prevent the imposition of a generation skipping
tax. 9 A devises to his son B a life estate in Whiteacre with remainder
to B's son C. Assuming that the value of the property at B's death is
greater than $250,000, a generation skipping tax will be imposed at
12. I.R.C. Secs. 2518(a) and 2056; WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE REPORT at
65. In the following discussion it is assumed that achieving the maximum marital de-
duction allowable is desired. For the law prior to 2518 see generally I.R.C. Sec. 2056
(d) and Treas. Reg. See. 20.2056(d)-i (1958).
13. The maximum marital deduction allowable is the greater of $250,000 or 50%
of the decedent's adjusted gross estate as defined in I.R.C. Sec. 2056(c)(2), less the
I.R.C. Sec. 2056(c)(1)(B) adjustment.
14. It will be included in both estates as an I.R.C. Sec. 2033 inclusion, since the
decedent owned the property at death. This property is not subject to the marital de-
duction since it exceeds the maximum deduction allowable. When the spouse receives
the property under the marital bequest, it will be included in the surviving spouse's
gross estate under I.R.C. Sec. 2033 when the survivor dies. However, the double taxa-
tion may be reduced by I.R.C. Sec. 2013.
15. The issue of partial disclaimers will be discussed later in this article as part
of an analysis of the Tax Reform Act of 1976. See text accompanying notes 74-87.
16. I.R.C. Sec. 2518(a); WAYS AND MEANS COMMiTTEE REPORT at 65. The pos-
sibiltiy of a surviving spouse disclaiming an interest in a marital trust and taking a
portion of the disclaimed interest under a non marital trust will be discussed later in
this article. For purposes of this example assume the property passes to the issue of the
surviving spouse.
17. Id.
18. Id. For an excellent discussion and example of disclaimers with respect to
charitable deductions, see Newman and Kalter, The Need For Disclaimer Legislation-
An Analysis of The Background and Current Law, 28 TAX LAW 571, 577 (1975).
19. I.R.C. Sec. 2518(a); WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE REPORT at 65. See sec-
tion 2614(c) and S. Rep. No. 94-1236, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 607 (1976).
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that time.2 If B disclaims his life estate, no generation skipping tax
will be imposed because B will be treated as never having owned a life
estate in Whiteacre.2 1
A disclaimer may shift the income tax consequences of a trust.2 A
devises to B, a wealthy individual with a large income, the power to
designate who shall be the recipient of an income interest in the trust
res (the power excludes designation of the grantor's spouse). B will be
taxed on the income of the trust because he has the power, exercisable
solely by himself, to vest the income in himself. 3 If B disclaims his
power he will not be taxed on the income." Assuming B disclaims and
the income is payable to B's son C (an individual with very little in-
come) income tax will be saved as a result of the graduated tax rates.
2. COMMON LAW
It is important to understand the common law history of disclaim-
ers because, prior to the enactment of section 2518, the federal income,
estate and gift tax consequences of a disclaimer were dependent upon
state law." In this period, many states lacked disclaimer statutes and
were dependent upon their own common law. Moreover, the disclaimer
statutes that had been enacted2 1 lacked sufficient uniformity to provide
20. See generally I.R.C. Secs. 2601-2614.
21. I.R.C. Sec. 2518(a); WAYS AND MEANS COMMITrEE REPORT at 65. I.R.C.
Sec. 2614(c) says for the effect of a qualified disclaimer see Sec. 2518.
22. I.R.C. Sec. 2518(a); WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE REPORT at 65.
23. I.R.C. Sec. 678(a)(1); Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.678 (a) -1 (1956).
24. I.R.C. Sec. 2518(c)(2) treats a power with respect to property as an interest in
such property. I.R.C. Sec. 2518(a) will treat B as never having the power if he dis-
claims it. In Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F. 2d 218 (10th Cir. 1954), rev'g. 119 F. Supp.
360 (D.C. Pa. 1953) a widow disclaimed a portion of her interest in a-trust. The court
held she was only taxable on the income of the portion she retained.
25. Brown v. Routzahn, 63 F. 2d 914 (6th Cir. 1933); Kenaith v. Comm'r, 480 F.
2d 57 (8th Cir. 1973), rev'g. 58 T.C. 352 (1972); Estate of Rolin v. Comm'r, 68 T.C.
919 (1977), aff'd. 588 F. 2d 368 (2nd Cir. 1978); Jewett v. Comm'r, 70 T.C. 430 (1978);
Treas. Reg. Secs. 25.2511-1 (c), T.D. 6334, 1958-2 C.B. 643; 20.2041-3 (d)(6) (1958);
WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE REPORT at 65.
26. ARIZ. REV. STAT. Sec. 14-2801 (1973); CAL. PROB. CODE Sec. 190.1 (Deer-
ing 1972); COLO. REV. STAT. Sec. 15-11-801 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. Sec. 45-300
(1972); FLA. STAT. Sec. 732.801 (1977); HAW. REV. STAT. Sec. 538-1 (repealed 1974
and Uniform Probate Code was adopted 560:2-801); IDAHO CODE SEC. 15-2-801
(1971) repealed 1973 by ch. 173 Sec. 1 S.L. 1978; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 /2, Sec. 2-7
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a standard law of disclaimers at the federal level.27 Therefore, federal
courts were frequently using common law rules in deciding controver-
sies involving disclaimers. The next portion of this article will briefly
outline the pertinent points of the common law: that is, who may dis-
claim, what may be disclaimed and when to disclaim.
A beneficiary under a will was permitted to disclaim his interest,"
whereas, an heir was not permitted to disclaim an intestate share be-
cause it passed by operation of law.29 A disclaimed interest in property
was treated as if it was never made."0 Therefore, a disclaimer became
an effective way to avoid the claims of creditors and/or to reduce
taxes.
3 1
One issue which arose at common law involved the question of
whether a disclaimer of part, but not all, of an interest in property .was
valid. The courts took varied positions. Some courts would not recog-
(Smith-Hurd 1976); IND. CODE Sec. 29-1-6 (1971); IOWA CODE ANN. Sec. 633.704
(West 1972); KAN. STAT. Sec. 59-2291 (1968); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. Secs.
554.501-520 (1972); N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW Sec. 4-1.3 (Consol. 1966);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. Sec. 1339.60 (Page 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84 Sec. 22
(West 1973); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. Sec. 34-5-1 (1956); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN.
Sec. 43-29 (1968); TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. art. 37A (Vernon 1971); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. Secs. 11.86.03-05 (1973); W. VA. CODE Sec. 42-4-3 (1959). The above listing of
state disclaimer statutes is intended to be illustrative and is not exhaustive.
27. Id.
28. For a collection of cases illustrating this point, see 6 BOwE-PARKER, PAGE
ON WILLS; 39, n.1 (sec. 49.2) [hereinafter cited as PAGE ON WILLS]; See also, New-
man and Kalter, Disclaimers of Future Interests: Continuing Problems and Suggested
Solutions, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW 827 (1974).
29. For a collection of cases illustrating this point, see PAGE ON WILLS 36, n. I
(sec. 49.1); see In re Meyer's estate, 107 Cal. App. 2d 799, 238 P. 2d 597 (2nd Dist.
1951); Watson v. Watson, 13 Conn. 83 (1839); Payton v. Monroe, 110 Ga. 262, 34
S.E. 305 (1899); Estate of Bliven, 236 N.W. 2d 366 (Iowa 1975); Central Fibre Prod-
ucts Co. v. Lorenz, 66 N.W. 2d 30 (Iowa 1954); Seeley v. Seeley, 45 N.W. 2d 881
(Iowa 1951).
30. For a collection of cases illustrating this point, see PAGE ON WILLS 41, n. 1
(sec. 49.4).
31. If fraud, collusion or estoppel is involved, the court will treat the disclaimer
as a conveyance. In re Kalt's Estate, 16 Cal. 2d 807, 108 P. 2d 401 (1940); Goodman v.
Jannsen, 234 Iowa 925, 14 N.W. 2d 647 (1944); Coomes v. Finegan, 233 Iowa 448, 7
N.W. 2d 729 (1943); Schoonover v. Osborne, 193 Iowa 474, 187 N.W. 20 (1922); In re
Hodge's Estate, 20 Tenn. App. 411, 99 S.W. 2d 561 (1936). However, the motive of
the disclaimant is irrelevant. Keniath v. Comm'r, 480 F. 2d 57 (6th Cir. 1973); Camp
v. United States, 16 AFTR 2d 6154 (M.D. Ga, 1965).
5
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nize a partial disclaimer,"2 while other courts would recognize a partial
disclaimer if the gift was severable. 3 No court, however, permitted a
partial disclaimer of a nonseverable gift absent a statute.3 4 Even before
section 2518 was enacted, many states changed the common law by
statutes which allowed the partial disclaimer of an interest in
property.3
At common law, the right to disclaim was not personal to the dev-
isee unless the testator evidenced a contrary intent.3 This. meant that
the representatives of a deceased devisee could disclaim in the name of
the devisee. 7 The power of a representative to disclaim is a significant
estate planning tool and will be discussed in more detail later in the
article.
To be effective, a disclaimer must have been made within a rea-
sonable time.3 On its face, this requirement seemed logical and under-
standable; however, the reasonable time requirement became an un-
workable standard for determining the federal tax consequences of a
disclaimer .3  The primary problem in using such a standard was the
fact that it had to be applied on a case by case basis.40 Prior to the
32. For a collection of cases illustrating this point, see PAGE ON WILLS 51, n. 1
(sec. 49.10).
33. Id. at 52, n. 4 (Sec. 49.10).
34. Id. at 51, n. 3 (Sec. 49.10).
35. See note 27 supra.
36. For a collection of cases illustrating this point, see PAGE ON WILLS 42, n. 1
(Sec. 49.5).
37. See Perkins v. Phinney, 7 AFTR 2d 1753 (D.C. Tex. 1967); Estate of Rolin
v. Comm'r, 68 T.C. 919 (1977); Estate of Dreyer v. Comm'r, 68 T.C. 275 (1976) acq.
1978-12 I.R.B. 6; Estate of Hoenig v. Comm'r, 66 T.C. 471 (1976) acq. 1978-12 I.R.B.
6.
38. For a collection of cases illustrating this point, see PAGE ON WILLS 46, 46-47
nn. 5-9 (sec. 49.8). There was both a common law requirement of reasonable time and
a federal law requirement of reasonable time. However, in many cases they were
treated as a single standard. See Keniath v. Comm'r, 480 F. 2d at 61; Estate of Rolin
v. Comm'r, 68 T.C. at 927; Estate of Dreyer v. Comm'r, 68 T.C. at 291; Contra,
Jewett v. Comm'r, 70 T.C. at 436.
39. WAYS AND MEANS COMMITrEE REPORT at 66-67. Notes 39-50, infra., illus-
trate many of the difficulties in determining whether a disclaimer was made within a
reasonable time.
40. See Estate of Dreyer v. Comm'r, 68 T.C. 275 (1977). Therein the court held:
"What is the reasonable time varies with the circumstances of each case. The time may
be very long if injury to others will not result." Id. at 293.
1 192 4:1980 1
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enactment of section 2518, it was nearly impossible to decide with cer-
tainty whether a disclaimer was made within a reasonable time. This
uncertainty was displayed in Brown v. Routzahn4 and the many cases
that followed. In Brown, the plaintiff (Brown) disclaimed an interest in
the property of his deceased wife eight years after her death but prior
to settlement and distribution of her estate. The circuit court held that
the disclaimer was effective for federal tax purposes because Ohio law
did not require a donee to accept or reject a gift within a specified
time; therefore, a rejection made prior to distribution was held valid.
Brown is the first case to recognize that a disclaimer is not a transfer
for tax purposes. After Brown, regulations were added requiring that
disclaimers be made within a reasonable time period after receiving
knowledge of the existence of the transfer.'2
In Estate of Rolin v. Commissioner,43 the decedent created a revo-
cable trust on April 28, 1958. He died on September 30, 1968, and his
spouse, the beneficiary of an interest in the trust, died on January 31,
1969. The executors of the deceased spouse disclaimed her interest
eleven years after its creation, but within eight months of its becoming
indefeasibly fixed. The timeliness of the disclaimer was at issue. The
court held that a reasonable time commences when the interest is in-
defeasibily fixed both in quality and quantity which, in this case, oc-
curred at Mr. Rolin's death. Thus eight months was held to be a rea-
sonable time.,"
In Kenaith v. Commissioner,5 the disclaimant had a vested
remainder subject to devestiture. The disclaimer was made nineteen
years after the creation of the interest but only six months after the
death of the life beneficiary. The court was faced with the difficult
question of determining when the period of reasonable time com-
mences. The Tax Court6 held that a reasonable time should be inter-
41. 63 F. 2d 914 (6th Cir. 1933).
42. Treas. Reg. Secs. 25.2511-1(c) (1958), 20.2041-3(d)(6) (1958).
43. 68 T.C. 919 (1977).
44. Id. at 927. Accord, In re Estate of Mixter, 372 N.Y.S. 2d 296, 83 Misc. 2d
290 (N.Y. County Sur. Ct. 1975). In Rolin, the court was dealing with the disclaimer
of a general power of appointment. See Treas. Reg. Sec. 20.2041-3(d)(6) (1958), which
requires the disclaimer of a general power of appointment to be valid under local law
and to be made within a reasonable time after learning of its existence.
45. 480 F. 2d 57 (8th Cir. 1973).
46. 58 T.C. 352 (1972).
7
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a federal standard; 7 nineteen years was held not to be a reasonable
time. The Eighth Circuit reversed the tax court saying:
In determining 'reasonable time' and the related issue of when the rea-
sonable time commences, we perforce, absent a federal statute or regula-
tion defining reasonable time, must look to the law of the states. We are
not conclusively bound by the state law, but this is the only field to
probe for legal decisions and discussions on the phrase 'reasonable time'
as used in the context of making valid disclaimers.48
After examining many authorities the court concluded that, when a
vested interest subject to divestiture is involved, the reasonable time
period commences after the death of the life beneficiary; not at the
time the interest was created.49 The result in Keniath was that a dis-
claimer made nineteen years after the creation of the interest, but six
months after the death of the life beneficiary, was within a reasonable
time. At that point, it became clear that allowing local law to dictate
what a "reasonable time" is presented an inadequate method of deter-
mining the federal tax consequences of a disclaimer.
47. The Tax Court relied on Fuller v. Comm'r, 37 T.C. 147 (1961) which held a
disclaimer 25 years after the creation of the interest was not within a reasonable time.
These tax court decisions create a federal standard, which measures a reasonable time
from the creation of the interest whether the interest is, a present interest or a future
interest, and whether it is vested or contingent.
48. 480 F. 2d at 61.
49.
We hold that under the prevailing common law and in particular, the
jurisdiction of the state of Minnesota the holder of a vested remainder subject
to divestiture has a reasonable time within which to renounce or disclaim the re-
mainder interest after the death of the life beneficiary and that an unequivocal
disclaimer filed with six months thereof is made within a reasonable time.
Id. at 64. Contra, Jewett v. Comm'r, 70 T.C. 430 (1978). In Jewett the court disagreed
with Keniath and held that state law does not necessarily provide an adequate guide to
the resolution of the federal tax question presented. The court measured the time from
the creation of the interest, rather than from the time the interest became indefeasibly
fixed, and concluded 33 years was not reasonable. The court relied on Keniath v.
Comm'r, 58 T.C. 352 (1972); Estate of Hoenig v. Comm'r, 66 T.C. 471 (1976); Fuller
v. Comm'r, 37 T.C. 147 (1961); Treas. Reg. Sec. 25.2511-1 (c) (1958). See also, Estate
of Halbach v. Comm'r, 71 T.C. 141 (1978).
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3. THE ADVENT OF 2518
As a result of the confusion and uncertainty surrounding the law
of disclaimers in the years following the Eighth Circuit's decision in
Keniath, considerable discussion of ways to clarify the law surfaced. °
It was suggested that the law of disclaimers be federalized and specific
disclaimer requirements be imposed." The widespread dissatisfaction
with the pre 1977 state of the law brought about the enactment of sec-
tion 2518.52
A disclaimer of an interest in property created after 1976 will be
effective for federal tax purposes only if it is a qualified disclaimer,
which is defined as:
[A]n irrevocable and unqualified refusal by a person to accept an interest
in property but only if-
(1) such refusal is in writing,
(2) such writing is received by the transferor of the interest, his
legal representative, or the holder of the legal title to the property
to which the interest relates not later than the date which is 9
months after the later of-
(A) the day on which the transfer creating the interest in
such a person is made, or
(B) the day on which such person attains age 21,
(3) such person has not accepted the interest or any of its bene-
fits, and
(4) as a result of such refusal, the interest passes without any di-
rection on the part of the person making the disclaimer and passes
either-
(A) to the spouse of the decedent, or
(B) to a person other than the person making the
disclaimer.0
If the recipient of an interest in property makes a qualified disclaimer,
50. 49 NOTRE DAME LAW at 837 (1974); COMMITTEE ON ESTATE AND GIFT
TAXES, TAX SECTION RECOMMENDATIONS No. 1974-2, 27 Tax Law 818 (1974).
51. Id. WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE REPORT at 66.
52. Id. The dissatisfaction stemmed from the fact that prior to 2518 disclaimers
were handled under many different code sections and in many different regulations and
were dependent upon local law. See Treas. Regs. Secs. 25.2511-1(c), 20.2041-3(d)(6),
20.2056(d)-I(a) (1958).
53. I.R.C. Sec. 2518(b).
9
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the property will be considered as having never been transferred to
such person.54
The intent of Congress in enacting section 2518 was the creation
of a federal standard for disclaimers, thus ending reliance upon state
law in determining the federal tax consequences of a disclaimer. 5
Therefore, it was hoped that section 2518 would create a safe harbor.
However, section 2518 (b) (4) (A) and (B) requires that the interest
must pass to a person other than the disclaimant or the spouse of the
decedent" (the decedent being the testamentary transferor). The ab-
sence of a federal rule or regulation determining who will receive the
disclaimed property"' prevents section 2518 from acting as a safe har-
bor, for the courts are now forced to look to local law in making this
determination. Consequently, if local law does not recognize the dis-
claimer, section 2518 (b) (4) cannot be satisfied. This can be illustrated
by the following example. In state X an intestate share could not be
disclaimed. B, an heir of A, satisfying all the requirements of section
2518 (except b(4) because the disclaimer was not recognized under
state law) disclaimed his intestate share. If section 2518 is to act as a
safe harbor, B's disclaimer should be a qualified disclaimer. It would
appear B's disclaimer is not, because the property, as a result of the
disclaimer not being effective under state law, did not pass to someone
other than the disclaimant. Therefore, the only way to be certain a
54. I.R.C. Sec. 2518(a).
55. "If the requirements of the provision are satisfied, a refusal to accept prop-
erty is to be given an effect for federal estate and gift tax purposes even if the local law
does not technically characterize the refusal as a disclaimer." WAYS AND MEANS COM-
MITTEE REPORT at 67. For a critical analysis of 2518 see Frimmer, Using Disclaimers
in Post Mortem Estate Planning: 1976 Law Leaves Unresolved Issues, 48 J. OF TAX.
322 (1978).
56. I.R.C. Sec. 2518(b)(4). A peculiar result is reached when a power is dis-
claimed. Section 2518(c)(2) treats a power with respect to property as an interest in
such property. Equating the power with an interest seems to indicate that powers may
be disclaimed. A problem is encountered when we apply 2518(b)(4) to the disclaimer of
a power. As a result of the disclaimer, the power is generally dissolved and conse-
quently does not pass to a person other than the disclaimant. It would appear that
section 2518(b)(4) was not intended to be literally applied to disclaimers of powers. See
Frimmer, 48 J. OF TAX 322 (1978).
57. There are no federal rules or regulations which deal with who the recipient of
the property will be after the property has been disclaimed. Therefore, local law must
be consulted.
10
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disclaimer will be a qualified disclaimer is to satisfy both state and
federal requirements.5
To rectify section 2518's apparent reliance upon state law and, in
turn, to fulfill the intent of Congress, section 2518 should be amended
to read: As a result of such refusal, the interest passes without any
direction on the part of the person making the disclaimer as if the dis-
claimant predeceased the transferor.9 Although the proposed amend-
ment would be reliant upon state law to determine the taker, it would
not be dependent upon the state's recognition of the disclaimer.
The most significant change brought about by section 2518 was
the establishment of a definitive time in which to disclaim. 0 Section
2518 changes the common law requirement (that a disclaimer be made
within a reasonable time) to a nine month period, adding much needed
certainty to the law of disclaimers. The only remaining question con-
cerns the determination of when this nine month period commences.
The Conference Report61 states the nine month period commences
with reference to each taxable transfer.1 Therefore, the disclaimant has
nine months after the taxable transfer in which to disclaim.
If the transfer is considered made when it is treated as a com-
pleted transfer for gift tax purposes, 3 with respect to inter vivos trans-
fers, or upon the decedent's death, with respect to testamentary trans-
fers, the use of disclaimers will be seriously impaired. The above
58. The above example assumes that an intestate share can be disclaimed under
Sec. 2518. This issue is discussed later in this article. In many cases, satisfying both
state and federal law will not create a hardship; however, in other cases, due to an
unreasonably strict state statute, it may prevent a disclaimer from being qualified only
because of the state law which governs.
59. See 49 NOTRE DAME LAw 839. The Uniform Probate Code also treats the
disclaimant as predeceasing the transferor. See Uniform Probate Code Sec. 2-801(c).
The mechanics of such a standard would entail the conveyance, by the disclaimant, to
the person who would receive the property as a result of the disclaimant being treated
as predeceasing the transferor. This would divest the disclaimant of title under state
law and vest title in the one who was treated as receiving it for tax purposes.
60. I.R.C. See. 2518(b)(2).
61. CONFERENCE REPORT ACCOMPANYING HR 14844 H.R. REP. No. 94-1515,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 623-24 (1976).
62. "The conferees intend to make it clear that the 9-month period for making a
disclaimer is to be determined in reference to each taxable transfer." Id. at 623.
63. A gift is complete forgift tax purposes when the transferor has reqlinquished
dominion and control over the property. Treas. Reg. Sec. 25.2511-2(b) (1958).
LR.C Section 2518 197 14:1980
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definition of transfer will make the disclaimer of certain interests in
property almost impossible. One such interest in property is created by
the exercise of a special power of appointment. Where a donee is given
a special power the gift (or devise) is a taxable transfer; the donee has
nine months from that date in which to disclaim for it to be considered
"qualified". If the donee chooses not to disclaim and subsequently ex-
ercises the power, the appointee's disclaimer, for it to be qualified,
must be made within nine months of the transfer of the power to the
donee. The nine months do not begin when the power is exercised since
the exercise of a special power is not a taxable transfer;64 consequently,
theo transfer creating the appointee's interest is the transfer of the
power to the donee. In many cases, the donee of the power may refrain
from exercising it for a period in excess of nine months. In such cases,
the appointee will be precluded from making a qualified disclaimer in-
sofar as he is unaware of his interest until it is too late.
In addition to making the qualified disclaimer of some interests
impossible, Congress' definition of transfer - taxable transfer - would
allow some "qualified" disclaimers to be made many years after the
interest was created. If we assume that a special power of appointment
can reach the hands of the holder of the power without the occurrence
of a taxable transfer (which can easily happen where the holder ac-
quired it for full and adequate consideration in money or money's
worth, for example, section 2516), when will the nine month period
begin for the appointee under the special power? This question can best
be answered in the negative. We know it does not begin when the
holder acquired the power since that was not a "transfer". We know it
64. The exercise of a special power of appointment is not a transfer (completed
transfer for gift tax purposes). See I.R.C. Sec. 2514, and Self v. United States, 142 F.
Supp. 939 (Ct. Cl. 1956). The death of B with a special power of appointment is not a
taxable transfer. See I.R.C. Sec. 2041; Clauson v. Vaughan, 147 F. 2d 84 (1st Cir.
1945); Janes v. Reynolds, 57 F. Supp. 609 (D. Minn. 1944). The reason the exercise of
a special power of appointment is not a transfer is because powers of appointment are
not interests in property. The following cases, although prior to I.R.C. Sec. 2041, are
useful to demonstrate that a power of appointment (general or special) is not an inter-
est in property. Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 316 U.S. 56 (1942), rev'g. 121
F. 2d 307, afld. 42 BTA 145; United States v Field, 255 U.S. 257 (1921). The exercise
of a general power of appointment is a transfer because of I.R.C. Sec. 2514 and a
general power of appointment is included in a decedent's gross estate because of I.R.C.
Sec. 2041 (not I.R.C. Sec. 2033).
12
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does not begin when the power was exercised since the dxercise of a
special power is not a "transfer". Insofar as no other events occurred,
we must conclude that the period never commenced; basic logic tells us
that a period which never commenced can never end. Therefore, in cer-
tain situations, the appointee can disclaim many years later (assuming
he has not accepted the interest or its benefits) and have it qualify.
The result in the above discussion would be vastly different if the
donee is given a general power as opposed to a special power. Since the
exercise of a general power is a taxable transfer, 5 the appointee will
have nine months from the exercise of the power in which to disclaim.
Thus, an appointee under a general power will always have nine
months to disclaim;6 whereas, the appointee under a special power (es-
pecially if it is a testamentary power) will rarely have such an
opportunity.
The obvious question that arises regarding the commencement of
the nine month period, is whether a disclaimer of property passing by
the exercise of a special power should be treated differently than a dis-
claimer of property passing by the exercise of a general power. If we
focus upon the disclaimant's right to disclaim, there is no justification
for such a distinction. The appointees under both a general and a spe-
cial power are similarly situated: they have no way of knowing if they
will be appointed, when they will be appointed or what they will receive
if apppointed. In each case, their ownership arises as a result of the
exercise of the power. Therefore, it is of little concern to the appointee
65. See I.R.C. Secs. 2514 and 2041. See also Treas. Reg. Sec. 25.2514-1(a)(1)
(1958). Section 2514 treats the exercise (or lapse) of a general power of appointment as
a gift. Section 2041 includes in the decedents gross estate property subject to a general
power of appointment. Note there is no code section which treats the exercise or lapse
of a special power of appointment as a gift. Similarly, there is no code section which
causes the property subject to a special power of appointment to be included in the
holder's gross estate unless the exercise of the special power is used to create another
power.
66. CONFERENCE REPORT ACCOMPANYING HR. 14844 H.R. REP No. 94-1515,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 623-24 (1976). The report gives the following example:
[I]n the case of a general power of appointment where the other requirements
are satisfied, the person who would be the holder of the general power will have
a nine month period after the creation of the power in which to disclaim. The
person to whom the property would pass by reason of the exercise-or lapse of the
power would have a nine month period after a taxable exercise, etc., by the
holder of the power in which to disclaim.
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what type of power the holder exercised.
The sole distinction between a general and a special power is with
respect to the federal taxation of the holder of the power. The holder of
a general power is taxed upon its exercise; the holder of a special
power is not.67 The imposition of a transfer tax upon the holder of the
power is an inadequate basis to justify disallowing the disclaimer by an
appointee under a special power (if made within nine months of the
exercise of the power), since the tax is unrelated to the rights of the
appointee. Therefore, it is unreasonable to require the disclaimer, by
an appointee under a special power, be made within nine months of the
transfer creating the power (which may be prior to the exercise of the
power), when an appointee under a general power is permitted to dis-
claim nine months after the exercise of the power. To remedy this un-
warranted distinction, as well as to cure the situation where no tranfer
occurs, section 2518 should be amended or regulations promulgated de-
fining transfer in a manner which treats the appointee under a geneal
and a special power similarly in all cases. Florida Statutes Section
732.801 provides an excellent example of when an interest must be dis-
claimed to assure that the recipient of any interest in property has a
fair opportunity to disclaim:
(5) Time for filing disclaimer-A disclaimer shall be filed at any time
after the creation of the interest, but in any event within 9 months after
the event giving rise to the right to disclaim, including the death of the
decedent; or, if the disclaimant is not finally ascertained as a beneficiary
of his interest has not become indefeasibly fixed both in quality and
quantity at the death of the decedent, then the disclaimer shall be recorded
not later than 6 months after the event that would cause him to become
finally ascertained and his interest to become indefeasibly fixed both in
quality and quantity. 8
The requirement that the disclaimant not accept any interest in the dis-
claimed property provides an adequate safeguard to prevent any abuse
that may arise as a result of allowing additional interests to be
disclaimed.
Many of the difficult questions raised by Keniath and Dreyer are
answered by section 2518, the most important of which is that contin-
67. See I.R.C. Secs. 2514 and 2041. Treas. Reg. Sec. 25.2514-1(a)(1) (1958).
68. FLA. STAT. Sec. 732.801(5) (1977).
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gent interests and vested interests subject to divestiture must be dis-
claimed within nine months of the transfer creating the interest. 9 How-
ever, section 2518 leaves many unanswered questions. It is not clear if
the right to disclaim is personal to the disclaimant or may be exercised
by his representatives after his death. The power of a representative to
disclaim in the name of the decedent can be very significant where the
recipient of an interest in property dies before he becomes aware, of
such interest or before he has accepted the property or its benefits. If a
representative is permitted to disclaim, the property will not be taxed
in the decedent's gross estate.70 If a representative is not permitted to
disclaim, the property will be taxed both when it is tranferred to the
decedent (gift or estate tax) and also upon the decedent's death.71 Thus,
to enhance the use of disclaimers as an estate planning tool, regulations
should be issued which make it clear that the right to disclaim is not
personal. In the absence of such regualtions, it would appear that the
right to disclaim is not personal since section 2518 does not address
this question, and furthermore, common law permitted it.
Another unresolved question is whether section 2518 changes the
common law by allowing the disclaimer of an intestate share. It would
appear that if section 2518 (a) is taken literally- ". . . disclaimer with
respect to any interest in property . . ." - a disclaimer of an intestate
share would be allowed. However, the congressional intent was to fed-
eralize the law of disclaimers, not to expand the common law; hope-
fully, regulations will be issued clarifying this point.
Similarly, it is unclear whether the disclaimer of an interest in
jointly held property will be effective for federal tax purposes. If the
right of each joint tenant vests at the creation of the tenancy (which is
a question of local law), a jointly held interest in property may not be
disclaimed for federal tax purposes, even if it is a valid disclaimer
under local law, since the disclaimant has accepted the interest in prop-
erty or its benefits.72
69. I.R.C. Sec. 2518(b)(2).
70. See I.R.C. Secs. 2033 and 2518(a).
71. For cases in which representatives of a decedent were permitted to disclaim
the decedent's interest in property; see Estate of Rolin v. Comm'r, 68 T.C. 919; Estate
of Dreyer v. Comm'r, 68 T.C. 275; Perkins v. Phinney, 7 AFTR 2d 1752; Estate of
Hoenig v. Comm'r, 66 T.C. 471; Contra, Uniform Probate Code Sec. 2-801(a). How-
ever, the double taxation may be reduced by I.R.C. Sec. 2013.
72. I.R.C. Sec. 2518(b)(3). See Ltr. Rul. 7911005. In the ruling, the service said
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Section 2518 changes the common law by allowing the partial dis-
claimer of certain interests in property. There is a conflict between sec-
tion 2518 (a) and section 2518 (c) (1) as to what may be partially dis-
claimed. Section 2518 (a) appears to permit the partial disclaimer of
any interest in property; whereas, section 2518 (c) (1) only allows the
disclaimer of "an undivided portion of an interest". Consequently, it is
uncertain what interests may be partially disclaimed.73 However, it ap-
pears that the congressional intent was only to allow the partial dis-
claimer of an undivided portion of an interest.74
The meaning of "an undivided portion of an interest" is unclear.7
Consequently, a devisee is faced with the dilemma of whether the dis-
claimer of any of the following interests will be a qualified disclaimer:
a fractional interest in property (an undivided one half interest), a por-
tion of a devise ($25,000 of a $50,000 devise or five acres of a ten acre
tract) or a carve out of an interest (a life estate or a remainder from a
fee). It is disturbing that Congress used the term without any further
elaboration. 7 This term, however, has been used in other code sec-
tions77 and interpreted in the regulations.7 1 It has been intepreted as:
"A person owns an 'undivided interest' in all substanial rights to a pat-
that if a joint tenant is vested with an undivided interest in the property at the creation
of the joint tenancy (a matter of local law), the disclaimant has accepted an interest in
the property or its benefits and the disclaimer will not be effective. This ruling, how-
ever, is based on law existing prior to section 2518's effective date. The conclusion
reached seems to apply to section 2518 as well, insofar as both section 2518 and the
prior law have the same requirement that the disclaimer must be made prior to accept-
ance. See also Krakoff v. United States, 313 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Ohio 1970); Bishop
v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. Miss. 1970), for the nonacceptance require-
ment which presumably remains unchanged by section 2518. In Letter Ruling 7922018,
the service ruled that a widow, who was the sole beneficiary and executrix under dece-
dent's will, did not accept its benefits where she segregated decedent's property and
income from it and admitted the will to probate for the sole purpose of her qualifica-
tion as independent executrix.
73. See I.R.C. Sec. 2518(c)(1); Frimmer, 48 J. OF TAX. 322.
74. THE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE REPORT at 67 says: "Under the bill, a
disclaimer with respect to an undivided portion of an interest is to be treated as a
qualified disclaimer of the portion of the interest if the requirements are satisfied as to
the undivided portion of an interest."
75. See Frimmer, 48 J. OF TAX. 322 (1978).
76. Id.
77. I.R.C. Secs. 170(f)(3) an 1235(a).
78. Treas. Reg. Secs. 1.170A-7(b)(1) (1972); 1.1235-2(c) (1965).
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ent when he owns the same fractional share of each and every substan-
tial right to the patent". 7 The above interpretation of an undivided
interest clearly allows partial disclaimers when a fractional interest is
involved."0
Another and more expansive meaning given to an undivided por-
tion of an interest is illustrated by an example in the regulations where
a taxpayer owns 100 acres of land and makes a contribution of 50
acres to a charity.8' Based on this contribution, the regulations con-
clude that the donor contributed an undivided portion of his entire in-
terest and a deduction would be allowed. If we apply the service's inter-
pretation of an "undivided portion of an entire interest" (as used in the
above regulation interpreting section 170 () (3) (B) (ii)) to section
2518, we find that the service should, and in all likelihood will, recog-
nize that there is little difference for federal tax purposes between a
fractional disclaimer (one half undivided interest) and a disclaimer of a
portion of a devise (five acres of a ten acre tract or $25,000 of a
$50,000 devise).12 Consequently, they both will be considered disclaim-
ers of an undivided portion of an interest. If the service rejects the
application of the above regulation (which is highly unlikely) as an in-
terpretation of section 2518(c)(1), and attempts to narrowly define
"undivided portion of an interest," the use of disclaimers to prevent the
overfunding of a marital bequest will be seriously impaired.83
No interpretation of an undivided portion of an interest has ever
encompassed the "carve out" of an interest. The carve out type of dis-
claimer can be distinguished from the other types of disclaimers previ-
ously discussed because of is effect on the disclaimant's estate. If a
79. Eickmeyer v. Comm'r, 580 F. 2d 395 (10th Cir. 1978). Eickmeyer applied
I.R.C. See. 1235(a) as interpreted by Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.1235-2(c) (1957). Treas. Reg.
Sec. 1.170A-7(b)(1) (1972).
80. See Frimmer, 48 J. OF TAx. at 324 (1978).
81. Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.170A-7(b)(1) (1972).
82. Both types of disclaimers are similar insofar as the disclaimed property will
be excluded from the disclaimant's gross estate (I.R.C. Sec. 2033) and the retained
property will be included (I.R.C. Sec. 2033). The following example demonstrates their
similarities. A is devised Whiteacre, a ten acre tract of land. If A disclaims an undi-
vided one half interest, the disclaimed property will not be included in his gross estate
at his death; the undivided one half he retained will be included in his gross estate. If A
disclaims five of the ten acres, the disclaimed five acres will not be included in his gross
estate at his death; the five acres he retained will be included in his gross estate.
83. See the text accompanying notes 13-18 supra.
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remainder is disclaimed from a fee, all the property (not just that
which is disclaimed) will be excluded from the disclaimant's gross es-
tate, since the retained interest is nondescendable.Y Conversely, where
a fractional disclaimer or a disclaimer of a portion of a devise is made,
only the disclaimed property will be excluded from the disclaimant's
gross estate, because the retained interest is descendable. The forego-
ing distinction indicates a possible justification for Congress' use of the
term undivided portion of an interest as opposed to some other term
i.e. to prevent the carve out of an interest from being a qualified dis-
claimer. Therefore, it would appear, although it is still uncertain, that
such a disclaimer cannot be a qualified disclaimer. In the interest of
clarity, regulations should be promulgated which specifically define the
interests that may be partially disclaimed. Florida Statutes Section
732.801 provides an excellent delineation of those interests that may be
partially disclaimed:
(d) An 'interest in property' that may be disclaimed shall include:
1. The whole of any property, real or personal, legal or equitable, pre-
sent or future interest, or any fractional part, share or portion of prop-
erty or specific assets thereof.
2. Any estate in the property.
3. Any power to appoint, consume, apply, or expend property, or any
other right, power, privilege, or immunity relating to it."
The most important and possibly the most interesting issue raised
by section 2518 is the federal tax consequences of a disclaimer which is
valid under state law but is not a qualified disclaimer as defined by
section 2518. It should be noted that state law, in certain situations,
may be used as a basis for imposing a federal tax 7 and/or to define
84. I.R.C. Sec. 2033. In Ltr. Rul. 7922018, a widow disclaimed the remainder of
a fee. The widow asked for a ruling as to whether such a disclaimer could be a quali-
fied disclaimer. The service declined to rule on this question since the I.R.S. does not
rule on issues that cannot be reasonably resolved before the issuance of regulations. An
interesting question raised is whether the disclaimer of a remainder of a fee will cause
inclusion under I.R.C. Sec. 2036. It seems clear that it may cause a transfer, not ordi-
narily a generation skipping transfer, to become one.
85. I.R.C. See. 2033.
86. FLA. STAT. Sec. 732.801(1)(d)1-3 (1977).
87. See, e.g., I.R.C. Sec. 2053(a) where the amount of the deductions allowed
are " . . . allowable by the laws of the jurisdiction, whether within or without the
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one's rights or interests with respect to property for purposes of apply-
ing a federal tax.m In this discussion, we will focus on the former. Con-
sider the following situation: B dies intestate with A his only heir; A
orally disclaims his entire intestate share. With regard to this example,
state law allows oral disclaimers; whereas, it is not a qualified dis-
claimer under section 2518. What is the federal tax effect of A's dis-
claimer? There are only two possible ways to answer this question
(neither of which is entirely satisfactory): (1) to give conclusive effect to
state law or (2) to give conclusive effect to federal law. If state law is
conclusive, the effectiveness of section 2518 will be thwarted since the
purpose of section 2518 was to eliminate the dependence upon state law
in determining the federal tax consequences of a disclaimer. s9 If federal
law is conclusive, A will be taxed on the transfer of property he never
owned; A never owned the property because state law determines the
ownership of property and rights with respect to property. 90
The beginning point to the solution of this question is Burnet v.
Harmel.91 In Harmel, the respondent, the owner of Texas oil lands,
executed oil and gas leases of the lands. On his income tax return, he
treated the gain from the leases as capital gain because the law of
Texas considered an oil and gas lease a sale. The commissioner argued
that regardless of its characterization under state law, the lease was not
a sale; therefore, the higher tax rate applicable to ordinary gain ap-
plied. Holding that federal law controls the federal tax consequences of
the lease, the court set forth the relationship between state and federal
law saying
United States, under which the estate is being administered".
88. See the cases cited in note 91 infra. In these situations, state law is only used
for the purpose of determining whether the federal law has been satisfied. The distinc-
tion between the uses of state law can be shown by using section 2518; the first use is
where a state disclaimer statute conflicts with a federal law (2518), and the second is
where section 2518 requires the determination under state law as to where the property
passes as a result of the disclaimer.
89. See WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE REPORT at 67.
90. See Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509 (1960); Leyth v. Hoey, 305 U.S.
188 (1938); Wentworth v. Comm'r, 510 F. 2d 883 (6th Cir. 1975); Estate of Peyton v.
Comm'r, 323 F. 2d 438 (8th Cir. 1963); Estate of Polster v. Comm'r, 274 F. 2d 358
(4th Cir. 1960); Estate of McNichol v. Comm'r, 265 F. 2d 667 (6th Cir.) cert. denied,
361 U.S. 829 (1959).
91. 287 U.S. 103 (1932).
I.R.C. Section 2518 205 114:1980
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Here we are concerned only with the meaning and application of a
statute enacted by Congress, in the exercise of its plenary power under
the Constitution to tax income. The exertion of that power is not subject
to State control. It is the will of Congress which controls, and the ex-
pression of its will in legislation, in the absence of language evidencing a
different purpose is to be interpreted so as to give a uniform application
to a nation-wide scheme of taxation . . . State law may control only
when the operation of the Federal taxing act, by express language or
necessary implication, makes its operation dependent upon State law.92
The Supreme Court reiterated this point in Morgan v. Commis-
sioner.93 In Morgan, state law characterized a power of appointment as
a special power; the service argued it was a general power. The court
held that, notwithstanding its charcterization under state law, the
power was general within the meaning of the revenue act.94
The holdings of Harmel and Morgan can be summarized into the
following rules:
92. Id. at 110. The Supreme Court went on to apply the law to the facts of the
case, saying:
But section 208 neither says nor implies that the determination of 'gain
from the sale or exchange of capital assets' is to be controlled by state law. For
purposes of applying this section to the particular payments now under consider-
ation, the act of Congress has its own criteria, irrespective of any particular
characterization of the payments under local law [citation omitted]. The state
law creates legal interests, but the federal statute determines when and how they
should be taxed.
But see United States v. White, 311 F. 2d 399 (10th Cir. 1962) and the service's disa-
greement and nonacquiesence in Rev. Rul. 63-120 1963-1 C.B. 141.
93. 309 U.S. 78 (1940).
94.
State law creates legal interests and rights. The federal revenue acts designate
what interests or rights, so created, shall be taxed. Out duty is to ascertain the
meaning of the words used to specify the thing taxed. If it is found in a given case
that an interest or right created by local law was the object intended to be taxed,
the federal law must prevail no matter what name is given to the interest or
right by the state law.
Id. at 80-81.
Many later cases have applied the rules enunciated in Morgan and Harmel to
varied situations. See, United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190 (1971) (liability
of spouse for income tax in community property state); Maytag v. United States, 493
F. 2d 995 (10th Cir. 1974) (whether a power of appointment was general or special);
Kean v. Comm'r, 469 F. 2d 1183 (9th Cir. 1972) (shareholder's status for subchapter S
election); Estate of Miller v. Comm'r, 58 T.C. 699 (1972) (incdme earned by estate
during administration).
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(1) If federal law does not expressly or impliedly depend upon the
characterization of an interest in property or a transaction under state
law, its characterization under state law is not controlling for federal tax
purposes.
(2) If federal law does expressly or impliedly depend upon the char-
acterization of an interest in property or a transaction under state
law, its characterization under state law is controlling for federal tax
purposes.
Depending upon which rule is applicable, state disclaimer statutes
may or may not control the federal tax consequences of a disclaimer.
In Doll v. Commissioner,95 the court set forth several tests which have
been used to determine whether Congress intended state law to control.
They are: (1) whether the purposes of the taxing act would be avoided
or defeated by applying state law, (2) whether the language or neces-
sary implication of the revenue statutory provision so requires, and (3)
whether through such application a uniform nationwide scheme of tax-
ation would be thwarted.98 If we apply these tests to section 2518, we
find that Congress did not expressly or impliedly intend for state dis-
claimer statutes to control.9" Therefore, regardless of whether a dis-
95. 149 F. 2d 239 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 326 U.S. 725 (1945).
96. Id. at 242. The tests have been developed through case law. See Estate of
Putman v. Comm'r, 324 U.S. 393 (1945); Rogers v. Helvering, 320 U.S. 410 (1943);
Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 151, 161 (1942); United States v. Pelzer, 312 U.S. 399,
402 (1941); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Estate of Sanford v. Comm'r, 308
U.S. 39 (1939); Thomas v. Perkins, 301 U.S. 655 (1937);
97. It may be helpful to refer back to the text accompanying notes 51-59. See
Estate of Halbach v. Comm'r 71 T.C. 141 (1978). In Halbach, the petitioner contended
that because the decedent's disclaimer of her remainder interest was both timely and
effective under New York law, such interest should not be included in her gross estate.
The Service conceding the fact that the disclaimer was valid under state law, but took
issue with the timeliness of the disclaimer for federal tax purposes. The court held that
the disclaimer was not timely for federal tax purposes saying:
Herein, we have no authority or desire to quarrel with the state court's decision
that the disclaimer was timely for probate purposes. The issue before that court
was the validity and effect of the renunciation in relation to a determination of in
which party legal title to the property would vest. That court had no need to take
into account, as this court must, the Congressional desire to impose a tax on the
transfer of a property interest. Therefore, what is a reasonable time for probate
purposes, any time prior to the vesting of title in the party renouncing the inter-
est, is not necessarily reasonable for our purposes, determining whether a trans-
fer of the property interest has occurred.
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claimer satisfies state law, its federal tax consequences are determined
solely upon its satisfaction of the requirements of section 2518.98 In
resolution of the situation presently under consideration, A's dis-
claimer, although valid under state law, will not be a disclaimer for
federal tax purposes.
State law, however, may play a role in determining whether the
federal requirements for a disclaimer have been satisfied. The operation
of section 2518, as previously discussed, is in some ways dependent
upon state law (recall the discussion of 2518 (b)(4)). The application of
state law in this situation raises the problem of whether a federal court
hearing a federal tax case is bound by a state court interpretation of
state law. In Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch," the Supreme Court
was faced with this very issue. The Supreme Court held that a federal
court applying state law is not bound by a state court decision unless it
is the decision of the highest state court.'
5. REVENUE ACT OF 1978
A 1978 amendment to section 2518 made it possible for property
to pass to a decedent's spouse as a result of a disclaimer even if the
surviving spouse was the disclaimant.'"1 This amendment is important
because it allows a surviving spouse to disclaim an interest in a marital
trust and take the property under a non-marital trust assuming the de-
98. This is not to say that state law will not have to be consulted. It may be used
to determine one's property rights if such a determination is necessary. This point is
discussed, infra, at notes 100 and 101.
99. 387 U.S. 456 (1967). For a more detailed analysis of Bosch see Sobeloff, Tax
Effect of State Court Decisions-The Impact of Bosch, 21 TAx LAw 507 (Spring
1968).
100.
This is not a diversity case but the same principle may be applied for the
same reasons, viz., the underlying substantive rule involved is based on
state law and the state's highest court is the best authority on its own law.
If there be no decision by that court then federal authorities must apply
what they find to be the state law after giving 'proper regard' to relevant
rulings of other courts of the state. In this respect, it may be said to be, in
effect, sitting as a state court.
387 U.S. at 465.
101. Tax Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2934 (1978), Sec. 702
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cedent's will is set up properly.12 A spouse will only make such a dis-
claimer when the marital bequest exceeds the optimal marital deduc-
tion i.e. an overfunding has occurred."0 ' The spouse will disclaim the
excess; thus raising the issue of whether it was the disclaimer of an
undivided portion of an interest' (except in the very rare case where
the total marital bequest will be disclaimed because the optimal mari-
tal deduction is zero). Consequently, the interpretation given to an un-
divided portion of an interest will determine the effectiveness of the
amendment.
The benefits to be derived by such a disclaimer are achieving the
optimal marital deduction and excluding the disclaimed property from
the disclaimant's gross estate. In theory, such a disclaimer is an effec-
tive post mortem estate plainning device, but before a spouse makes
such a disclaimer, he or she will have to be convinced that it is a bene-
ficial course of action. These benefits become apparent when the spouse
realizes that the property interests he or she will receive in a properly
102. The decedent's will must contain a marital bequest (one which qualifies for
the marital deduction) and a non-marital bequest (one which does not qualify for the
marital deduction and does not cause the property to be included in the spouse's gross
estate), with the decedent's spouse named as the beneficiary under each trust. The non-
marital bequest should be drafted in a manner so as to give the spouse all the incidents
of ownership consistent with its exclusion from the spouse's gross estate (see footnote
104 infra). In addition, it would be wise to include in the decedent's will a clause which
provides that any property disclaimed shall pass to the non-marital trust (see appendix
A).
103. The optimal marital deduction is not necessarily the maximum marital de-
duction allowable (for example, where the decedent's adjusted gross estate is less than
$425,000). The reason the spouse will not disclaim, unless the marital bequest exceeds
the optimal marital deduction, is because when considering the value of tax deferral,
the estate tax burden will be at a minimum when the optimal deduction is used; conse-
quently, nothing will be achieved by such a disclaimer aside from increasing the burden
of estate taxes.
104. Congress intended the amendment to apply to partial disclaimers where the
spouse disclaims property passing under a marital trust. See The Staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation, 96th Cong. 1st Sess., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TAX RE-
FORM Acr OF 1978 at 443 (1979) where it states:
The Congress believes that, where the decedent's spouse refuses to accept all
or a portion of his or her interest in property passing from the decedent and, as a
result of such refusal, the property passes to a trust in which the spouse has an
income or other interest, such disclaimer should be recognized as a qualified
disclaimer.
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drafted non-marital trust are substantially equivalent to those dis-
claimed.105 Therefore, once the spouse understands the situation, there
is no logical reason why he or she will refuse to disclaim.
The following example demonstrates the importance of this
amendment. B (A's spouse) dies, his will created a marital trust and a
non-marital trust. A is the beneficiary of each trust. Due to an error in
the marital deduction formula clause in B's will, the marital trust was
overfunded. The optimal martial deduction for B's estate is $500,000
(one half of B's gross estate of $1,000,000); $600,000 was devised to the
marital trust. B's will provided that any property that is disclaimed
shall become part of the non-marital trust (see appendix A for the
form of such a clause).'m A disclaims $100,000 of the $600,000 marital
trust. As-,a result of A's disclaimer the property passes to the non-
marital trust (pursuant to the clause in decedent's will). Prior to the
1978 amendment it was unclear whether A's disclaimer was a qualifed
disclaimer since the disclaimed property did not pass to a person other
than the disclaimant. This amendment would treat A's disclaimer as a
qualified disclaimer, thus allowing the optimal marital deduction and
excluding the disclaimed property from A's gross estate.
Carrying the above example one step further, assume A has an
estate of $100,000 at her death. If A does not disclaim and dies ten
years after B (not having disposed of any of the property), A's gross
estate will be $700,000 ($100,000 of A's property plus $600,000 from
the marital trust); if A disclaims the $100,000 excess, A's gross estate
will be $600,000 ($100,000 of A's property plus $500,000 from the
marital trust). If we assume A has no deductions, credits, or adjust-
105. The property interests the spouse receives under a marital and a non-mari-
tal trust are not all that different in substance. The spouse can receive, under a non-
marital trust, the following: a life estate, a special power of appointment, a five and
five general power of appointment, a general power of appointment subject to an ascer-
tainable standard, and a trustee can be given the power to invade the corpus for the
spouse's comfort or maintenance.
106. Rev. Rul. 76-156, 1976-1 C.B. 292 seems to allow such a clause to deter-
mine the taker of the disclaimed property. This ruling dealt with an issue which arises
where the decedent's will gives the disclaimant a special power to appoint his dis-
claimed interest. The service ruled that a disclaimer coupled with a power to appoint is
not a disclaimer but is a taxable gift. The service implied that where the decedent's will
disposes of the disclaimed property in an ascertainable manner, the disclaimer will then
be recognized. See Newman and Kalter, Disclaimers By Surviving Spouse 181
N.Y.L.J. I (Jan. 15, 1979),
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ments to her gross estate, an additional $100,000 will be taxed on A's
death if she does not disclaim. The tax rate on the additional $100,000
in A's estate is 37%; the value of the disclaimer is $37,000 in this case.
A $37,000 tax savings should not be treated lightly.
6. CONCLUSION
The enactment of section 2518, as demonstrated above, changed
the common law in many respects. It improved the prior law by creat-
ing a definitive period in which to disclaim i.e. nine months, requiring a
writing, and most importantly, creating uniform rules governing the
law of disclaimers. Although it was not the intent of Congress to
greatly expand the interests that may be disclaimed, section 2518, al-
though unclear, appears to permit the disclaimer of both an intestate
share and also some partial interests in property. Hopefully, regula-
tions will be able to clear up this uncertainty in a manner that will
enhance the uses of disclaimers. Section 2518's shortcomings are its
dependence upon state law and its disallowance of the disclaimer of
certain interests because of its definition of transfer. To cure the above
shortcomings section 2518 should be amended.
It is obvious that section 2518 is a long way from being perfect. It
is a beginning and, as this article has demonstrated, section 2518, if
liberally construed and properly amended, can be made into an effec-
tive law of disclaimers.
Donald J. Jaret
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APPENDIX A
The following disclaimer forms were taken from P-H Wills forms
3875 New Forms and Ideas.
FORM FOR A DISCLAIMER "QUALIFIED" UNDER THE
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976
I, , beneficiary under the will of
deceased, do hereby unqualifiedly and unconditionally and completely
disclaim, reject and refuse to accept the legacy/devise made to me
in the Last Will and Testament of said , who died
on the - day of , 19 -, said Last Will and Testa-
ment having been resident of City/County,
State/Commonwealth of I have received and
retain no interest in the property I herein disclaim and this disclaimer
is completely irrevocable, regardless of any occurrences either pior
to or subsequent to its execution.
Signed
The - day of
19-.
FORM FOR A STANDARD DISCLAIMER CLAUSE
If any devisee and/or legatee named in this Will should renounce and
disclaim in whole or in part, any property I have herein devised and/or
bequeathed to him or to her, then in that event I give, devise and be-
queath the property so renounced and disclaimed to
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